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SHALL THE AGE JURISDICTION OF JUVENILE

COURTS BE INCREASED? I.
ARTHUR W.

ToWNE2

At present children 15 years old and younger in New York State,
charged with any offense except murder in the first degree, as well
as those alleged to be with no proper guardianship, are brought under
the beneficent wing of the children's court. Boys and girls who have
reached or passed their sixteenth birthday, upon becoming enmeshed
in the toils of the law, are haled before the bar of our criminal courts.
The question before us is as to whether boys and girls 16 and 17 years
old-that is, up to their eighteenth birthday-should also be embraced
within the inquiry and control of the children's court. In other words,
when is a child not a child? That famous query, "How old is Ann?"
pales into insignificance beside the riddles confronting us tonight. At
what age does our Ann of the children's court cease to be an impressionable, irresponsible girl, and'become instead a mature, thoroughly
stabilized and rational woman, prepared, if need be, to face with
impunity the ordeals of the magistrate's court? And, likewise, as to
Ann's brother. Does he go to bed the night before his sixteenth birthday, a tender boy in need of the state's solicitude, and awaken the
next morning a bearded man, full-fledged in experience and self-control, and in ability to fulfill his obligations as a citizen? Upon donning his long trousers does he forthwith become a man; or in spite of
his somewhat lengthened years and clothes, may he still be in his short
"pants" mentally and morally? As one ponders over these perplexing
age problems one soon discovers about eighteen arguments against
such a revolutionary, dangerous change as is proposed in the law, and
fully eighteen other reasons in favor of this perfectly natural and
needed reform.
Just because the subject is so debatable it merits careful examination from every angle-physiological, psychological and social, as
well as legal and administrative. Especially is this true since it seems
impossible to find any printed discussion of its many aspects. Therefore, even at the risk of over-extending the length of the paper, it
,Preqented at the New York City Conference of Charities and Correction.
May. 1919.
2Superintendent, Brooklyn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
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has seemed best to view the matter, first, in a more or less general and
'theoretical way before taking up the more concrete operative details.
As will be pointed out later, certain states have already amended
their juvenile c6urt laws so as to include these older youths within
their scope. The problem will have to be considered by the legislatures of other states. The main principles dealt within this paper will
probably be applicable to the situation in other states as well as in the
Empire State.
PART I.

SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS

Objections to Increasing Age Jurisdiction.-I am not at all unmindful of the different objections urged against the proposed change.
For instance, it may be asked: Are not many boys and girls of 16 and
17 as hardened and dangerous as some of the worst adult criminals?
Don't girls marry at 16 or 17, and didn't boys of 17 help win the war?
If those 16 or 17 years old knowingly violate the law, why shouldn't
they suffer the full penalty the same as adults? Is there not already
too much disrespect for law, and wopldn't the mollycoddlings of the
children's courts, applied to these older offenders, be pooh-poohed
by the young ruffians and gunmen and taxi-bandits in the community,
and threaten us with a gigantic crime wave? Anyway, shouldn't we
have concern primarily for the welfare of the little children, and
wouldn't the bringing of the older youths into the children's court
seriously menace the younger boys and girls? In fact, wouldn't such
a practice rob the children's court of its distinctive merits as a tribunal
especially devoted to children?
In reply it may be admitted that certain boys and girls of 16 and
17 may be about as depraved and dangerous as some prisoners at Sing
Sing. The same may be true of those younger. Nor can it be disputed that lads and girls of 17, even at 15 and 14, sometimes display a
maturity equal to that of many grown-ups; just as, on the other hand,
those in their forties may still be infantile. But what we should consider is the average type. Exceptional cases can be considered later.
Let us not get excited about disrespect for law or crime waves.
These things exist where there are no children's courts. Where is
the evidence that the children's courts would deal any more leniently
with youths needing disciplinary or custodial care than do our judges
of criminal courts? Far too often the judge of the criminal court,
who has never previously seen the youth arraigned before him, looks
upon his offense as trivial, regards him as a first offender, and lets
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him go on a suspended sentence; whereas, if the same youth were
before a children's court he would likely be there recognized as a wellknown customer, and the children's court judge would be less inclined
to suspend sentence.
One of the above questions suggested that youths in their teens
who knowingly overstep the law have proven themselves unworthy of
mercy and should be held responsible for the consequences of their
acts. Will we never get over that hoary notion about worthiness and
unworthiness? Do physicians vary their treatment of typhoid fever
on the basis of whether the patient violated the laws of hygiene with
or without deliberation, and of whether the patient is worthy or
unworthy? No; what the doctor seeks is not a moral appraisal of the
cause, but the cure of the bad effects. So with our courts, the essential matter is not whether the youth is worthy or unworthy; the thing
is to deal with him in such a manner as is most likely to protect
society and reform him. It remains to be shown that the children's
courts are not just as capable of effectively handling boys and girls
of 16 and 17 as are our criminal courts. Certainly the methods thus
far employed with this age group by our criminal courts have not
achieved success to an especially conspicuous degree. It is therefore
fitting to ask whether there are grounds for believing that the childdren's courts might handle boys and girls of 16 and 17 with any better
results than our adult courts. The subject deserves our open-minded
examination.
Disadvantagesof Trying Youths in Adult Corts.--It is certainly
a sad spectacle to see boys and girls of 16 or 17 forced to run the
gauntlet of police lock-up, arraignment in the magistrate's court, trial
in the court of special sessions or the county court, and incarceration
in jail or some other adult correctional institution. Is it not a reproach
upon our laws that a. girl of 16, virtuous in character, charged with
some minor infraction of the statute, should still be officially locked
behind the bars with drunks and prostitutes? In addition to the contamination likely from this promiscuous herding the stigma of a criminal court record is, in itself, a terrible handicap-sometimes ruinously so.
Day after day our machinery for turning out indictments and felonious convictions has to be -halted by the human feeling in the breasts
of our judges and jurors; it breaks down out of sheer repugnance at
the injustice of the system as applied to a large proportion of these
young persons. The reluctance of the courts to adhere to the harsh
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letter of the law is witnessed in the proportion of cases in which
pleas are unnecessarily accepted to lessened charges, in which sentence is suspended or a petty fine imposed when more rigorous treatment is needed, and in which there are dismissals with a warning. It
used to be deemed necessary to send little children through this same
pitiless mill and to stamp them with the criminal brand, but society
has gradually outgrown this barbarism. Most people would welcome
some practical reform which would overcome the shortcomings of our
venerable criminal law in its operations towards these youths of 16
and 17.
Particularly would such a change be welcomed by parents of
wayward sons and daughters. For the ordinary father and mother
naturally dislike to stigmatize either their children or themselves by
making a charge of incorrigibility, or of any other kind, in the police
court. As a result of this parental unwillingness to seek magisterial
aid the boy or girl of 16 or 17 who is starting on the downward path
often continues without restraint and grows from bad to worse. Likewise, the police and others, desirous of sparing boys and girls of these
ages from the notoriety of a police court appearance, are often unduly
lenient, when curbing and correction are sorely needed. With many
of these youths the delinquent tendencies do not take serious form or
are not discovered until about this age, and they have never had the
benefit of treatment through the children's court. Parents and others
who hesitate about resorting to a police court would often gladly avail
themselves of the chance to invoke the help of the children's court
were its age jurisdiction made to enbrace these two additional years.
There is not much hope of sufficiently bettering conditions in our
criminal courts and institutions for adults so as to bring about the
humane and specialized treatment desirable.
The establishment of a special court for young adults, so-called,
such as is found in certain cities, is hardly practicable in small communities, and is, at best, a halfway measure. This -will later be pointed
out more at length. These courts still remain criminal courts; they
offer no fundamental change in the underlying principles of the treatment.
We are led to inquire, then, as to whether the juvenile court
should be enabled to cover the period up to the eighteenth birthday.
The Juvenile Court Idea.-The juvenile court idea rests upon the
recognition that children are entitled to special consideration on account of their tender years. During the superstitious middle ages, when
duly constituted tribunals solemnly tried dumb animals on criminal
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charges and imposed penalties, one such court, upon finding a mother
pig and her litter of baby pigs guilty of trampling upon and killing a
human child, sentenced the adult hog to death, but magnanimously
released the juvenile pigs under suspended sentence because of their
immaturity and inexperience. For centuries after this it continued to
be the practice of judges, who thought more of the blind majesty of
the state and the inviolate rights of property than of the lives of boys
and girls, to condemn children of 8 and 10 years to death upon the
gallows for petty offenses. Within the last two decades we have
at last caught at least part of the vision possessed by that sixteenth
century animal tribunal, and now we mollify the rigors of the law
in dealing with most child delinquents under 16.
The juvenile court idea recognizes that children often overstep
the law out of mere mischief, without any wrongful intent; that they
are generally the victims of unfavorable environment and evil associations; that they have as a rule been deprived of proper parental
guidance, and that, even when aware of the wrongfulness of their
transgressions, they are usually creatures of impulse without those
powers of resistance and self-control that ordinarily develop with
maturer experience and judgment. It is the duty of the state to give
to the child who has made a slip another chance; to reclaim him, if
possible,; as a normal, useful member of society, and to shield him from
the handicaps and baneful atmosphere of criminal courts and jails.
To these ends the juvenile court tries the cases of children separate and apart from those of adults; it segregates them from grown-up
culprits, both during preliminary detention and in the subsequent institutional treatment; it does not criminally convict those who have
broken the law, but either finds them guilty only of juvenile delinquency, or adjudges them as in need of the care and protection of
the state; and it makes liberal use of social, medical and psychological
diagnostic resources and of the probation service.
Age Jurisdiction Raised in Other States.-Men used to shake
their heads when this juvenile court idea was first launched. While
it is not yet demonstrating one hundred per cent efficiency, we have
got used to the idea, and no one would go back to the old criminal
procedure in dealing with children under 16. Heads have also been
shaken in other states when the proposal has been made to bring boys
and girls of 16 and 17 within the juvenile court law; but in several
states this step has been taken. In certain states the wisdom of the
step has been carefully inquired into by state commissions on child
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welfare or other bodies before the age has been advanced. Some
states include youths still older.
For the sake of accurate knowledge the actual results in these
states should be investigated through case analyses, field studies and
statistical research. So far as I know, this has not been done on an
extensive scale. The request to prepare this paper reached me too
late to enable me to institute any systematic inquiry concerning the
outcome where the experiment has been made. No public protests
against the step have come to my attention, and, judging from the
very limited information at hand, the test has apparently been on the
whole satisfactory. In the absence of data as to the actual fruits of
experience this paper must treat the subject largely from other viewpoints. (See note at end of paper.)
Trend in Other Child Welfare Legislation.-This revision upward
is in keeping with the general trend of legislation affecting child life.
Various laws exemplify this tendency to encourage what John Fiske
calls the "prolongation of infancy." As society grows in complexity,
it takes longer to prepare a boy or girl for full participation in the
duties of life. Compulsory school attendance and child labor laws
have steadily been reaching higher in the chronological scale. England, Ontario and certain American states (including New York) have
lately enacted provisions requiring a certain amount of school attendance in continuation schools up to the eighteenth birthday. The age
of consent, which in this and nearly half of the other states is 18, is
approaching this age in other states. Girls under this age and boys
under 21 cannot marry without parental consent, and their marriages
can be annulled. Minors have incapacities as to making civil contracts. A minor cannot even manage his own property without a
guardian. Boys are not entitled to join the army short of 18. No one
can vote or hold public office under 21., A movement has been started
in certain states where girls become emancipated and attain their
civil majority at 18 to push the age up to 21. Legislators are more
and more cloaking childhood and youth with special immunities and
protection, and the upper legal age limits of childhood are steadily
advancing.
Proper Basis of Determining Age Linits.-Of course no special
age limit established by law for any particular purpose should be
taken as a criterion in determining the proper age for other purposes.
That strange notion which still lingers about the complete transformation of the body every seven years is as mystical as was that old
belief of the Egyptians about the sanctity of the number seven and
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its multiples. Equally absurd is the supposition of any inherent merit
in placing the age of civil majority at 21, or the age limit of our children's court jurisdiction at 16. If facts justify, it may even be desirable and practicable for the children's court to exercise authority
over certain matters up to one age and over other matters to a different
age. The desirable age demarcation with respect to any particular
subject matter should be decided, not on the ground of precedent or
analogy, but on the basis of the nature of the acts, the capacities of
the children, and their relationship to society.
Whatever age cleavage is legally adopted must necessarily be
more or less arbitrary; it cannot conform to the varying degrees of
development among those individual children either above or below
the boundary line who deviate from the normal. In establishing age
divisions for any such purpose we should view the children of a particular age period as a group. Critics should not scrutinize the line
of separation with a microscope, but should survey it along with the
two bordering age groups, viewed as extended intervals of time.
The immediate question is whether youths of 16 and 17 are so
different from those of say 14 and 15 as to justify and require a dividing line at their sixteenth birthday in their court treatment.
To answer this, let us recall certain characteristics of childhood
and youth. At the risk of what may seem rather protracted comment on certain scientific aspects of childhood and adolescence, I ask
you to turn your attention to the following facts because they afford
one of the best grounds upon which we may rest our conclusions
as to whether 16 and 17-year-olds are most properly to be considered
as juvenile or adult.
Stages of Physical Growth.-All growth is by gradual change
rather than by sudden leaps. While one set of organs is maturing,
another may be only just beginning to unfold. Biology shows that
each organ passes through three successive stages-first, increase in
size; second, exercise of the organ, accompanied by further growth
in size; third, the putting on of the finishing touches in its functioning, and the acquisition of ripened powers of endurance. Maturity
cannot be measured by mere bulk. If it could, a girl of 15 would
be practically a woman, for she is then practically full grown as to
height, and has ordinarily obtained nine-tenths of the weight she will
have at 20. A boy of 15 is usually three-quarters grown in weight
and nine-tenths in stature. But they are no more mature than is a
full-sized Baldwin apple which is still green. The brain attains
practically adult size by the age of seven, but nobody would for a*
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moment think of the mentality as being anywhere near adult at that
age. The onset of pubescence and its usual completion shortly before
the sixteenth birthday probably account, as much as any other single
item, for the placing of the upper boundary of the children's court
age span at the sixteenth birthday. Yet viewed solely as a physiological change, this event comes not at the entrance upon adulthood but
rather as an introduction to the stage preparatory for manhood and
womanhood. Even anatomical completion of the body is not reached
till after the twenty-first year.
Adolescent Changes in Personality.-A human being is more than
an animal body; our distinguishing mark is our mental, moral and
social natures. And these, too, grow in irregular stages after the
fashion of our physical natures. Different psychic qualities and abilities develop at different ages, each following its own special time
schedule. Some ripen early; some late. The maturing of the intellect
and of character takes place even more slowly than the physical maturity. This is especially important in connection with our problem,
because conduct and misconduct are, after all, primarily an expression of the psychic side of life.
Adolescence is ordinarily said to start at the age of 12 years or
thereabout and run to the neighborhood of 25. Throughout this
period the psychic individuality, in both the conscious and the subconscious regions, is in a constant flux and mutation. No greater error
could be made than to consider a child as passing into adulthood simply because of a certain degree of physical development. The transition of the mind from its childhood state to tliat of normal adulthood
is just as essentiaf a part of the growing-up process as is the bodily
side, and this psychic growth requires much longer to attain maturity.
Modern psychology no longer clings to the old classical partitioning of the mind into intellect, feeling and will. Any psychic act may
involve an interweaving of all three of these mental processes. Human
personality vibrates with thousands of ancestral, social and associational ties and with thousands of intermingling currents of impulse
and feeling. Our personality is not a mosaic of distinct faculties, but
a restless, surging sea of psychic life; forever absorbing from without
and welling up from within; at once susceptible to myriad subtle
environmental influences, and eagerly responding, to every outer stimulus, through its internal urgings toward activity and self-expression.
Maturity is to be measured not on the basis of mere intellectual
capacity; the personality must be viewed in its totality, with due
regard to the instinctive, emotional, volitional and social elements, and
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to the achievement of a normal degree of stability and unity of purpose.
With the physical metamorphosis, which usually comes at 14 or
15, there are ushered in new impulses and sentiments and a rebirth
of self-consciousness which powerfully influence the youth's subsequent development, psychically and socially. For the next few years
the interests of the boy and the girl multiply, wax and wane; there
is emotional unrest; the desire for personal assertion adds its tension,
and the whole individuality and character undergo reshaping and
readjusting. This age period, 15, 16 and 17, is the season of budding
romantic love, of religious conversions, of breaking away from parental control, of entering upon self-support, or defying customs and
authority as never before. It is pre-eminently a time of meeting new
situations, getting a new outlook on life, and making new adaptations
in thought, feeling, aims and social relationships. Both boys and
girls are in a vortex of adolescent experimentation, stumbling and
instability. They are in a stage when their bodies are taking on the
finishing touches, when their intellectual powers of judgment and
foresight have progressed still less, and when their moral and social
reactions are even less organized. It is a critical period because they
are just acquiring self-mastery over instinct and emotion and building
up habits of application and moral reflection, and finding their social
orientations.
The Unfolding of Reason.-The more we analyze human behavior and the part played by pure reason the more we wonder who
the humorist was that first dubbed man a "rational being." Most
mortals are far more powerfully swayed by their scores of instincts
and social pressures. He who fancies that a lad reaches the "age of
discretion" at 14, as taught by the old common law, or that reason
seizes the helm with a firm hand at 16, simply flies in the face of
present-day psychology and the hard facts. While crude reasoning
processes are getting under way by the fourteenth year, they arrive
gradually at man's estate. Like every other habit, the exercise of
reason grows only with practice. Its control over conduct is conditioned by the extent of the youth's experience with different sides
of life and by the relative strength of his various contending nonrational tendencies. The guidance of conduct through reason and ''
self-control is an art that has to be learned like any other art. The
middle adolescent period is when nature carries on this educational
effort. Not before the eighteenth birthday, in the vast majority of
persons, do we discover anything like full-blossomed deliberation,
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understanding and conviction. The eighteenth birthday usually comes
during the senior year in high school; the sixteenth birthday corresponds to the sophomore year. Would we attribute adult judgment
and foresight to boys and girls at either of these periods? Intellectual maturity certainly does not come before the eighteenth birthray; most of us would probably date its arrival considerably later.
"First Maturity" at 18.-We are accustomed to say that girls
mature earlier than boys. Yet we have the authority of G. Stanley
Hall that girls do not ordinarily reach what he terms their "first
maturity" until 18 or 20. The literature of psychology leaves no
doubt that, viewing the matter from this angle, boys and girls are
as a rule still juvenile up to their eighteenth birthday.
After 18 the changes iti personality are less marked than before.
Few new ingredients enter into the make-up of the individuality.
The traits which are to run through life are now pretty well established. The instinctive and emotional life are not altered much from
now on, except as to assuming more fixed and intensified forms. The
greatest change that comes about shortly after 18 is the enhancing
of the role played by reason. Experience increases, and judgment
and foresight gradually mount in their authority.
During the middle adolescent years, from 15 to 17 inclusive, the
boy and girl are juvenile; during the later adolescent years, from 18
to 25, the personality and character become more and more adult.
Sixteenth Birthday Not a Cleavage Point.-The foregoing outline of what goes on during the journey from childhood through
youth to adulthood shows that the sixteenth birthday does not make
a natural boundary between any two of these periods; rather it falls
in the midst of a stretch of years from about 14 to 17 inclusive, which,
especially from their mental and moral development, have as a rule
much in common, and are clearly not adult. The sixteenth birthday
does not have as valid a claim as either the fifteenth or the fourteenth birthday as a point of cleavage between childhood and youth.
The eighteenth birthday is a more logical dividing line than is the
sixteenth between adulthood and the preparatory period which precedes it.
The individuals, among delinquents as well as among non-delinquents, present wide variations as to their degree of bodily, intellectual
and character development. Some will be wayward and difficult;
others orderly and easily led. Some will be retarded or precocious
by nature, others handicapped or forced by an unusual environment
or experience. A youth of the streets may be far more mature in so
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far as so-called knowledge of the world is concerned than the lad
from a refined home and protected environment; but the street lad
is usually not so far advanced in his ideals and moral defense mechanism. The wide variability in the maturity of children and youths
makes us wish that the basis of determining whether an offender
should be taken before a juvenile or an adult court might be considerations entirely distinct from mere years and months. But age classifications must continue to be recognized. If the juvenile court has
demonstrated its ability to cope with the various types of 14 and 15year-old boys and girls, it is a good augury that it can, on the whole,
successfully handle those 16 and 17. For, in general, those during
this two-year period are much more juvenile than adult.
Character of Offenses of Older Youths.-But we are facing not
a theoretical situation but an eminently practical problem-one about
which society can ill afford to make any scatter-brained experiments.
Granted that 16 and 17-year-old youths are still juvenile, it would
be folly to attempt to handle them in the children's courts if their
delinquency were of a type with which these tribunals cannot successfully cope.
Authorities on criminology point out that with increase in age
comes an increase in the gravity of the offenses, until some point in
early adult life when the curve turns downward again. The misdeeds
by young boys are usually due to nomadic and vagrant impulses.
They next assume more and more the form of trespass against property. As their physical development becomes more manlike, their
offenses against property tend to be rather more serious, and in addition they more frequently commit crimes of violence and against
chastity. Not until the age of 21 to 25, according to most authorities,
do the most serious deeds of violence, and those involving deliberation
like fraud, reach their peak. In the case of females the years immediately following the present juvenile court age lead oftenest to waywardness, centering about sex.
It must of course be granted that very serious offenses-highway
robberies and murder-are every now and then committed by youths
of 16 and 17. Perhaps exception should be made in these cases; this
will be discussed later. But, on the whole, the offenses of boys and
girls at these ages bear a close resemblance to those chargeable to
children 14 and 15 years old. Anyone acquainted with the work of
our juvenile courts knows that the wrongdoings of boys and girlsparticularly the former-at these ages are not infrequently just as
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serious (burglaries, assaults with dangerous weapons, and even homicide) as those coming before our criminal courts.
While the circumstances vary with each individual instance, and
while, as already said, some cases may possibly be so very grave as to
demand other methods than those to be had in the juvenile court, it
does not seem unreasonable to believe that, on the whole, the cases
presented by boys and girls 16 and 17 can be dealt with in the juvenile
courts, provided the necessary equipment and machinery are available.
In this connection let me quote Dr. William Healy, our foremost
authority on juvenile delinquency: "I venture to say from long observation that the vast majority of offenders at 17 or 18 years of age
are still in great need of being understood and treated by the methods
in vogue in a well-conducted juvenile court, where past records with
all their showing of factors in environment, personality, opportunities,
etc., carbe taken into account for further disposition of the case."
Extending the Age Jurisdiction With Respect to Neglected Children.7-Before taking up the administrative problem of handling the
offenseg of those 16 and 17 years old through the juvenile court, let
us inquire whether corresponding grounds exist for enlarging the
jurisdiction of these courts with respect to the cases of boys and
girls of this same age period where the complaint would be one of
neglect; that is, where the youth instead of being an offender, is a
victim of some offense or neglect by an adult. Should greater safeguards be thrown about these youths than they now enjoy, through
extending the upper range of our no proper guardianship laws and
related statutes?
Parental duties toward their sons and daughters certainly do not
cease at the end of the fifteenth year. The fact that a child goes
to work and becomes at least partly self-supporting does not release
the parents from their moral responsibilities. As indicated above,
the trend in the law relating to public education is to lift the compulsory school attendance age to 18. If children are entitled to education
up to that age, they certainly have an equal or greater right to sympathetic moral protection to this same age. Every child protective
agency can cite case after case in which boys and girls 16 and 17 need
judicial protection against selfish, brutal and depraved fathers and
mothers. Countless boys and girls during these adolescent years certainly suffer from parental ill-treatment, indifference and bad home
conditions, especially from harmful moral influences, just as much as
those younger.
It is my belief that the statutory provisions covering different
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forms of neglect and ill-usage should be raised to a higher maximum
age, and that it should be left to judicial discretion to construe such
provisions in accordance with a rule of reason. The courts would
naturally take cognizance of the fact that the age of the child would
often tend to modify the effects of parental neglect.
Besides furnishing direct aid, sometimes in the form of foster
care, to these youths, this change would help toward making it possible
to hold parents more strictly to their legitimate responsibilities with
respect to their children of 16 and 17. Parental coercion through the
criminal law would often in these cases be most salutary.
The raising of the no proper guardianship age limit would also
contribute to prevent much of the harm that now befalls these young
persons through poolrooms, dance halls, cabarets, street loitering and
other baneful associations and influences. Numerous statutes intended
as protective measures for youths at this adolescent period are virtually dead letters because of their lack of co-ordination with a no proper
guardianship law of sufficient scope. At present it is often impossible
to reach out and shield a youth of 16 or 17 who is in moral jeopardy,
because of lack of proof of the commission of an overt act in violation of law, whereas the needed guidance and control might readily
be furnished if the neglect law made it possible to admit evidence
showing simply the harmful conditions and influences surrounding the
boy or girl.
The lifting of the chronological range of child neglect would
also facilitate the prosecution of adults guilty of sex offenses against
boys and girls of 16 and 17. The societies for the prevention of cruelty to children in this state, restricting their activities to efforts in
behalf of children within the range of the children's court, that is, those
under 16, take an aggressive part in bringing sex offenders against
these younger children to justice. There is usually no agency vigilantly at work in behalf of similarly safeguarding the morals of girls
of 16 and 17. Although the age of consent in this state is 18, how
few men are prosecuted for rape when their victims are 16 and 17.
These laws deserve better enforcement. Admittedly they are harder
to enforce at these ages, and some have expressed the fear that the
attempt to enforce them when the complainants are young women
of 1 or 17 would embarrass the handling of cases where the victims
are younger. I do not fully share this apprehension. Public opinion
has much to do with shaping standards and judgments in this field.
The elevation of the age to which girls can be treated as neglected
children (and that is what many, yes, most, of these 16 and 17-year-
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old girl victims are) would promote a truer understanding of these
statutory rape and other sex cases and give more support to the prosecuting authorities. Thus greater protection would be given to girls
who are usually more in need of safeguarding at this epoch in their
lives than ever before
The extension of the age jurisdiction of the juvenile court in
cases of neglected children would be a decided boon to both boys and
girls during these two years, which are so filled with exposure and
temptation and other dangers.
PART

II.

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

A State-wide Problen.-Before trying to put any such reform
into operation as this suggested extension of the children's court age
jurisdiction in cases of delinquent and neglected children, we should
carefully inquire into certain facts. We should bear in mind, in the
first place, that the problem affects not New York City alone, but is
state-wide. Governor Whitman was forced to veto a bill increasing
the age jurisdiction of a proposed county children's court in Chautauqua County to 18, because, as he pointed out, an offense cannot
be made non-criminal and triable civilly in one part of the state while
it is criminal elsewhere.
Every now and then we encounter the assertion that city children, particularly those from the metropolis, present special difficulties
which militate against dealing with them and with rural children by
the same means. This prejudice does not stand the test of experience.
We are dealing with an age problem which pertains to both urban
and rural communities, and in my opinion the reform is as feasible
in one part of the state as another. It must be viewed as a state
problem.
Question of Extent and Equipment.-Viewing the increase of the
age jurisdiction of our juvenile courts as an administrative problem,
we must bear in mind the number of additional cases which would
thus be thrust upon these courts, upon the institutions and upon the
various other agencies. Some thousands of extra cases would each
year be unloaded upon the children's courts in New York City alone.
The number of 16 and 17-yeaz2-old youths found in the course of a
year in jails and other adult correctional institutions in this state liketvise vqould probablr fun into four figures; and under the proposed
change somewhat similar numbers of additional inmates might conceivably 'have to be- accommodated in juvenile iistitutions.
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While theoretically these older children should be dealt with by
juvenile courts, the feasibility of such a step depends largely upon
the sufficiency of the resources and co-operation available to these
tribunals. Do we possess, or can we secure, the equipment essential
to master the new situation that would be created? This query demands that we analyze the chief factors a little in detail.
Temporary Detention Quarters.-The scheme of extending the
age jurisdiction of the juvenile courts would be incomplete without
parallel provisions for the preliminary detention of the 16 and 17-yearolds awaiting trial or the disposition of their cases in suitable places
separate and apart from police lock-ups and jails. As yet we can
boast of few such detention quarters even for children of 15 and
younger in this state. Only three or four municipal juvenile detention homes have thus far been established, none of them in modern,
well-equipped buildings; while in probably less than a dozen other
places in the state are the younger children cared for in the temporary shelters of the local societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children. Elsewhere police stations and other makeshifts are still
in use. It would be difficult to find a single place in the state having
thoroughly modern and proper facilities for the segregation and care
of the children already requiring to be held for the children's courts.
The work of looking after the older girls in a juvenile detention
home especially accentuates the moral problem of proper separation
of the girl inmates on the basis of age, development and character.
The presence of boys 16 and 17 years old would complicate the problem of discipline and of physical restraint against escape. Even with
ample space, the admission of these older youths would call not only
for greater segregation but also for more or less modification in the
methods and in some instances in the staff. It might even be found
advisable in some of the larger cities to use a special building for
part, or all, of the older youths.
While in some places, where the average number of children to
be detained is small, it might at times be safe to house the older
youths in the present juvenile quarters, it would certainly not be
right in the larger centers of population to jeopardize the welfare
of the younger children by any wholesale herding wyith these older
youths in the temporary detention quarters. The matter of providing
suitable facilities for the observation, study and care of these older
boys and girls merits thoughtful study.
Segregation in the Children's Courts.-Likewise, it would have
to be made possible to keep these older lads and girls away from
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their younger brothers and sisters while in the children's courts. In
the smaller courts this would not be difficult. With courts having a
large volume of work the problem would not always be so simple.
Indeed, in New York City it might become necessary to appoint one
or more additional judges in the children's courts, and, perhaps, to
establish one or more special parts or sessions of the court for the
trial of these older adolescents. The increasing practice of hearing
juvenile cases in chambers rather than in the open court-room, would
greatly assist in solving the problem of segregation in so far as the
hearings themselves are concerned. This device would not necessarily
guarantee protection against harmful mingling in the rooms in the
court where the children are held immediately before and after the
hearings. To accomplish this in certain of our larger courts there
might even have to be changes in the architecture of the courthouse.
A more serious predicament is that New York State does -not
yet have a state-wide system of juvenile courts. About three thousand
magistrates still have jurisdiction to try children's cases in the Empire
State. The cases are often tried in all manner of buildings and rooms,
and according to all kinds of methods and standards. What we need
is the organization of a system of special county or district courts or
parts to hear children's cases. When we have such tribunals, presided over by qualified judges and properly equipped, there would
seem to be no good ground for hestitation about letting these judges
try and dispose of the cases of children up to their eighteenth birthday, provided we have the needed institutional and other facilities.
Probation.--Probationis the measure best adapted for dealing
with most of these older delinquents. Indeed, certain investigations
would indicate that young persons in their later teens often have more
appreciation of the opportunities afforded by probation, and are more
responsive, than those younger. If the service is prudently conducted,
little trouble need be encountered in trying to keep the different ages
and types properly separated. But, before we add to the burdens
of our children's court probation officers, let us frankly face the truth
that they have long been staggering under far too heavy a burden.
One of the best means of solving the problem of 16 and 17-year-old
offenders and of reducing the number recruited to their ranks would
be through strengthening their probationary oversight while 12, 13, 14
and 15 years old. With a higher age jurisdiction the enlargement
of the staffs of our juvenile courts would be imperative.
Many of those arrested after their sixteenth birthday* are still
nominally under probation in the children's court; for under the letter
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of the law that court may continue its oversight for three years. Yet,
in practice the children's court finds it difficult to discipline violators
of the probationary conditions after their sixteenth birthday4 on
account of the difficulty in securing the admission of the offenders
to suitable institutions. Any such breaking down of the probation
naturally undermines its value. If the children's court is to try lads
up to 18, it should be given statutory control over the probationers for
say three years, that is, to their twenty-first birthday, and it should
also be assured of the necessary institutional facilities for dealing
effectively with those who violate its confidence.
Institutional Needs.-The most serious difficulty which would be
created by adding to the age jurisdiction of juvenile courts would
doubtless be in connection with the handling of the older youths in
institutions. It would do little good to have their cases adjudicated
in the children's courts if they were to continue to be sent to, county
jails and similar dens of corruption as at present. At the same time
every precaution should be taken against the mingling of these older
delinquents with those younger and susceptible of contamination.
While we are over-supplied with institutions for dependent and
neglected children under 16, the same cannot be said of institutions
of a reformative type. In fact, we do not have as liberal accommodations as needed for certain types of" delinquent girls. Yet, to a
certain extent, 16 and 17-year-old delinquents could be cared for in
our present juvenile reformative institutions, provided the needed
segregation is made possible. This would be less easy, of course, in
institutions on the congregate plan. It would seem to be the opinion
of many, if not most, superintendents of reformatory institutions on
the cottage plan in country locations, that the older youths can safely
be cared for in places of this character without detriment to the
younger inmates. They already hold many of their inmates beyond
their eighteenth birthday, sometimes to the twenty-first birthday;
and this is not deemed objectionable so long as the proper separation is maintained. It is certain, however, that adequate facilities
would not be found in our present juvenile institutions of a reformative type for all of the 16 and 17-year-old offenders needing commitment, and for those older ones who would violate the conditions
of their probation. Special accommodations would have to be
developed to care for a good proportion of these older offenders.
Probably the most practical means of meeting the need would be
through the establishment of certain state or city institutions for these
older adolescent offenders.
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Equity Versus Criminal Trials.-It is assumed in this paper that
the bringing of 16 and 17-year-old delinquents before the children's
court should ordinarily spare them from a criminal conviction, and
that they would be found guilty of juvenile delinquency, as at present,
or preferably that their cases would be heard in equity, in which event
they would be adjudged in need of the care and protection of the
state. It is to be hoped that we need not wait long for the constitutional amendment which will confer this equity jurisdiction upon these
tribunals.
In connection with the above suggestion for the founding of
special institutions for these older youths we think of the New York
City Reformatory for Male Misdemeanants, Cheshire Reformatory in
Connecticut, Shirley School in Massachusetts, Preston School in California, and the modified Borstol reformatories in England. Yet, if
our children's courts are soon to acquire an equity jurisdiction, they
would be expected not to sentence to punitive institutions as a penalty,
but to commit to training schools for the purpose of providing for the
delinquents' education and welfare. This would mean, for example,
that under the equity jurisdiction a children's court would not be free
for example to sentence a youth to Elmira. The status of the suggested special institutions should be like that of our present juvenile
reformatory institutions, which are deemed charitable rather than
corrective in nature.
It may be pointed out, however, that certain states applying equity
methods permit the children's court to waive jurisdiction in case of
an aggravated offense and to transfer the case to a criminal court.
Elsewhere the children's court itself has both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Perhaps our legislature would deem some such provision
desirable, at least at first. If this is to be done, it would seem preferable to allow the children's court itself, in cases of emergency, to exercise this criminal jurisdiction. The district attorney might be authorized to move a criminal trial whenever he feels that the public interest
demands such a step, as for example in a murder case. I would expect,
however, that with proper institutional resources this would seldom
be necessary, for the civil procedure of the juvenile court would probably be adequate to cope with most all the problems coming before it.
(Wherever the courts are given an administrative discretion, comparable to that where a judge of the children's court might deny a
child the privilege of an equity hearing and order a criminal trial, it is
important that the judge upon the bench should be of the highest
ability and character in order that this discretion may not be abused.
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It is also important that the judges disposing of the cases of these
older lads, and having the power to commit to juvenile institutions,
should display knowledge and judgment, for otherwise some judges
might contract the habit of committing these young persons by the
wholesale to these institutions, much to the institutions' embarrassment. These dangers would be lessened by reducing the number of
judges with jurisdiction over juvenile cases, and by having a system
of county or district courts possessing exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile cases.)
System of Transfers.-Granted that the most careful inquiry is
made by the court, or some other agency, as to the institution to which
a particular juvenile offender should be committed, it will every now
and then happen that the disposition will prove unsatisfactory in that
he is more properly a subject for some other institution. Our system of transfers from one institution to another is more or less limited and cumbersome. Once we raise the age jurisdiction of the juvenile courts the importance of a better transfer system would be
increased. A growing body of opinion favors the plan whereby original commitments would be made, not to specific institutions but to
some state or local board which would have the power to select the
institution in which the delinquent is to be placed, and to make such
transfers as may prove desirable. This idea is being worked out, for
example, in Ohio arid New Jersey. It is suggested at this point simply
as being worthy of consideration in connection with any plans for
coping with the new institutional problems which would be created
through the extension of the age jurisdiction of our juvenile courts.
Extradition and Uniform Legislation.-It would be unfortunate
if any obstacle should be placed in the way of extraditing young persons from other states who are guilty of grave offenses for which
they should be brought back and tried, or who are fugitives from institutions. Our present extradition laws cover only criminal cases. The
increasing of the age range of juvenile courts might at times make
it desirable to extradite those charged with grave offenses. This
might require certain reservations in our laws permitting the lodging
of criminal charges against such absconders. The value of uniformity
in the laws of the several states with respect to age limits is also to be
borne in mind.
Child Protective Societies.-If the age jurisdiction of the juvenile court is to be increased with respect to neglected children, as well
as delinquents, we need to ask whether the child protective agencies in
the state are in a position to handle the increased volume of neglect
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cases. The answer must be in the negative. This is another reason
for moving slowly.
Extension of OriginalAge JurisdictionBeyond 18 Undesirable.The question may arise as to whether an extension of the age jurisdiction to the eighteenth birthday might be followed by a demand
that it be extended later to the twentieth or twenty-first birthday.
This is not an immediate likelihood; and the burden of proof is certainly upon those who would be bold enough to advocate such a step.
In some states the age jurisdiction varies for the two sexes. Certain states try girls up to their eighteenth birthday in the juvenile
court, but hear cases of boys in this court only to their seventeenth
birthday. In other states the ages are reversed. If any distinction
between the sexes should be deemed necessary in New York it would
seem best to follow the example of those states which have adopted
the eighteenth birthday as the top limit for girls and the seventeenth
for boys.
Sometimes a boy or girl believed to be guilty of having committed an offense while fifteen or under is not formally charged with
the act until he or she has become 16 or over, whereupon the question arises as to whether the case shall be heard in the children's or
an adult court. Such hearings belong in the children's courts and this
is the established practice in New York City. If the age jurisdiction
of the children's court is to be lengthened, it should be clearly stated
what is to be done in these border-line cases where the culprit guilty
of an act within the court's age jurisdiction passes the upper age limit
before being apprehended or officially charged with the offense.
Special Police Courts for Youths.-An entirely different means
of trying to avoid the evils of handling the cases of young persons
in their middle teens in the ordinary criminal courts has been attempted
in certain places. Special courts, or parts of courts, usually a branch
of the police court, have been set up for the trial of charges against
young folks from 16 to 21 or thereabouts. The English laws especially recognize those of this age as young adults. The first such innonovation in this country came about in 1914, when the Chicago Municipal Court instituted a special part, known as the "boys court," which
tries misdemeanor complaints against lads from 17 to 21. The idea
has been tried in a few other places, and a similar court has been suggested for New York City.
The primary purpose of such courts is to keep the youths apart
from old and hardened criminals. A special court for young delinquents here in New York City would separate the older adolescents
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from adult offenders; the stigma of court arraignment might be somewhat lessened; more specialized treatment would be possible; and
other advantages might accrue. But the procedure would probably
differ little if any from that now followed in our criminal courts, and
the court would probably not try felony cases. Boys and girls of 16
would likely associate with those of 20. The problem would still
remain of trying to secure proper care of the boys and girls, awaiting
trial, outside of police stations and jails, as well as proper care of those
under commitment, in the right kind of institutions. Any such plan
would be hard or impossible of operation outside of the larger centers of population, for we could not expect small communities to
establish these special courts. On the other hand the plan of taking
these young persons before juvenile courts could much more readily
be carried out in rural districts.
The idea of a special part in a police court for the trial of these
adolescent delinquents is at best a halfway measure and does not have
the positive, constructive merits of our first proposal, that of increasing the age jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. Youths of 16 and 17
are still juvenile and should be dealt with as such.
CONCLUSION

The question before us as to age jurisdiction cannot be answered
categorically. From the theoretical standpoint the change is desirable, but there are practical difficulties. The problem cannot be dealt
with in isolation, but is interwoven with other problems. The problem should receive thoughtful investigation before any legislation is
contemplated. There should be a harmonious correlation of juvenile'
court laws with those affecting institutions and other phases of child
welfare. Equally important is it to recognize that proposals are also
being made every now and then that the juvenile court be developed
into a family court, with jurisdiction over non-support, illegitimacy,
adoption, divorce, and kindred matters in addition to juvenile delinquency and neglect. The problem of 16 and 17-year-old youths is
largely a family problem and would fit into the program of such a
family court. Advocates of an increase in age jurisdiction to 18
should not think that this is the only, or the most pressing, need. The
most urgent need is the establishment of a state-wide system of county
or district courts, be they juvenile or family courts, where juvenile
cases, whatever the age limit may be, can be handled. Let us first be
sure of our machinery, judicial and institutional, before we tack on
these extra two years. Eventually they should be added.
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(Note: Through the courtesy of the Federal Children's Bureau
the following facts are added concerning the age limits in the juvenile
court laws of the various states:
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court in fourteen states extends
to children under sixteen years of age.
4

5

6

These are Alabama, 3 Colo-

rado,
Georgia, , Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas," New Jersey, 9 New
1
Mexico,10 New York, Oklahoma,1 2 Pennsylvania, 3 Rhode Island, 4
Tennessee, 15 and Vermont. 16
2
7
Delaware,"8 Florida, 5 Illinois, 0
In thirteen states-Arkansas,
Kentucky, 2 '
2

Louisiana, 2 2

7

Massachusetts, 23
27

28

Michigan, 2 4

Missouri, 25

2 5

Texas, and Wisconsin -and the District of Columbia,"° jurisdiction is extended to seventeen years.
Montana, 6 New Hampshire,

3
Ala. General Laws, 1915, No. 506, sec. 1. (In Jefferson County, girls
under 18.)
4Colo. Revised Statutes, 1908, sec. 586. (Delinquent girl under 18.)
5
Ga. 1915, No. 210, sec. 2, amended 1916, No. 575.
6lnd. Burn's Annotated Statutes, 1914, sec. 1630. (Delinquent girl under 18, dependent boy or girl under 17.)
7
1owa. Supplement, 1913, sec. 254, art. 14.
SKans. General Statutes, 1915, sec. 3065, amended 1917, C. 154.
9N. J. Compiled Statutes, 1910, p. 1887, sec. 206; 1912, C. 353, amended
1918, C. 81; 1918, C. 82.
'ON. M. 1917, C. 4, sec. 2.
I1N. Y. Consolidated Laws, 1909, C. 40 (Penal), art. 44, sec. 485, amended
1916, C. 278; sec. 486, amended 1912, C. 169; 1915, C. 480, and 1917, C. 430;
1910, 2C. 611, sec. 2; 1913, C. 270, sec. 2; 1918, C. 464, sec. 1.
1 Okla. Revised Laws, 1910, sec. 4412.
13Pa. 1903, p. 274, sec. 1, amended 1909, p. 89; 1909, p. 119; 1911, p. 543;
1911, p. 959; 1913, p. 1039, and 1915, p. 304; 1913, p. 711, sec. 11, amended 1915,
p. 988; 1915, p. 1017, and 1917, p. 1015.
14R. L 915, C. 1185, sec. 1, amended 1917, C. 1546. (Wayward and dependent
under 17.)
15Tenn. Public Acts, 1911, C. 58, sec. 1, amended 1913 (first extra session).
C. 22; 1915, C. 177; 1917, C. 41, and Private Acts, 1917, C. 294; 1917, No. 120,
p. 355.
36Vt. General Laws, 1917, sec. 7323.
17Ark.
1911, art. 215, sec. 1, amended 1917, art. 420. (Girl under 18.)
' 8 Del. Revised Code, 1915, secs. 3827-3828. (Applies to Wilmington. Girl
under 18.)
19Fla. 1911, C. 6216, sec. 1, amended 1913, C. 5494; 1915, C. 6919, and 1917,
C. 7332.
20111. Hurd's Revised Statutes, 1917, C. 23, sec. 169. (Girl under 18.)
Carroll's Statutes, 1915, sec. 331e, I. (Girl under 18.)
2-'Ky.
2
La. Constitution, 1913, art. 118, sec. 3.
23
Mass. 1906, C. 413, sec. 1, amended 1912, C. 187, and 1916, C. 243. (Neglected
2 4 under 16.)
Mich. Compiled Laws, 1915, secs. 2011 and 2017.
25
Mo. 1917, p. 195, sec. 1.
26
Mont. 1911, C. 122, sec. 2. (Dependent under 16.)
27N. H. Public Statutes Supplement, 1913, C. 85 (Laws, 1907, C. 125, sec. 1),
amended
1915, C. 96, and 1917, C. 74.
2
STex. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1911, art. 1197, amended 1913, C. 112,
C. 26. (Girl under 18. Dependent and neglected children under 16.)
and 21918,
9
Wis. Statutes, 1915, sec. 573-I. (Girl under 18.)
30D. C. 34 U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 73, sec. 8.

JURISDICTION OF JUVENILE COURTS

515

In seventeen states-Arizona, 31 Connecticut,3 2 Idaho,33 Minnesota,3 4 Mississippi, 35 Nebraska,- 6 Nevada, 7 North Carolina, 38 North
Dakota, 39 Ohio, 40 Oregon, 41 South Carolina 4 2 South Dakota, 43 Utah,"
Virginia,43 Washington, 46 and West Virginia 4 7 -to eighteen years.
In Maryland4 8 the limitation is extended to eighteen for girls and
twenty for boys, and in California49 to twenty-one for both girls and
boys. A number of states 0 provide that jurisdiction once obtained
over any minor may continue beyond these age limits, usually until he
reaches twenty-one.)
Revised Statutes, 1913 (Civil Code), sec. 3562.
3Ariz.
32Conn. 1917, C. 308, sec. 4.
33Idaho. 1911, C. 159, sec. 152, amended 1917, C. 84.
-4Minn. 1917, C. 397, sec. 1.
35Miss. 1916, C. 111, sec. 6.
36Veb. Revised Statutes, 1913, sec. 1263.
37Arev. Revised Laws, 1912, sec. 728.
3sN. C. 1915, C. 222, sec. 2.
39N. D. Compiled Laws, 1913, sec. 11402.
40O0tio. General Code, sees. 1642 and 1643, amended 1913, p. 864.
4'Oreg. Lord's Oregon Laws, 1910, sec. 4406.
42S. C.

1917, No. 73, sec. 1; 1912, No. 429, sec. 1.

43S. D. 1915, C. 119, sec. 1.
44Utah. 1913, C. 54, sec. 2.
45Va.
1914, C. 57. (Dependent under 16.)
46
Wash. 1913, C. 160, see. 1.
47W. Va. 1915, C. 70, sec. 1, amended 1917, C. 63.
4sMd. 1916, C. 326, sec. 2. (In Baltimore, under 16.)
49
Cal. 1915, C. 631a, secs. 1 and 5, amended 1917, C. 627 and C. 634.
50Ala. General Laws, 1915, No. 506.

